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Changing to Win? Threat, Resistance, and





Much of what we know about strikes is grounded in the context of
postwar Fordism, a unique historical moment of relatively institu-
tionalized labor-management relations. Yet the resurgence of cor-
porate resistance over the past quarter century, coupled with an
increasingly hostile political and economic climate, has fundamen-
tally transformed the American industrial landscape. Drawing from
this research and insights on social movements and formal orga-
nizations, we expect unions will vary considerably in their response
to threats. Our analysis, based on a comprehensive data set of U.S.
strikes from 1984 to 2002, reveals the importance of such intra-
movement cleavages for strike activity and for the prospects of or-
ganized labor in the contemporary United States. We conclude by
discussing the implications of our findings for scholarship on threat
and social movement challenges more generally.
CHANGING TO WIN?
Strikes have long played a central role in working-class struggles in the
United States (Brecher 1972; Franzosi 1995). Employees strike to win
economic benefits (Wallace, Leicht, and Raffalovich 1999), contest man-
agement rights on the shop floor (Gouldner 1954), and pressure state actors
( Jenkins and Brents 1989). Given their importance, interest in strikes has
spanned the social sciences, including economics, sociology, and political
1 We thank David Jacobs for generously providing much of the state-level data used
in this article and for comments on a prior draft. Thanks also to Bruce Nissen, Daniel
Tope, Michael Wallace, Andrew Sullivan, Thomas Maher, and the Inequality Working
Group at Florida State University for comments on earlier drafts. Direct correspon-
dence to Andrew W. Martin, Ohio State University, 238 Townshend Hall, 1885 Neil
Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210. E-mail: martin.1026@sociology.osu.edu
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science (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Hibbs
1976; for a review of this research, see Edwards [1981] and Franzosi
[1989]). Much of this rich theoretical and empirical work is firmly rooted
in the context of postwar Fordist production relations, when collective
bargaining was largely institutionalized, especially in core manufacturing
industries (Kaufman 1981; Rubin 1986).
Yet the past quarter century has witnessed a dramatic change of course
as labor-management relations have become increasingly fractured and
contentious (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Harrison and Bluestone
1988). Notable events include President Reagan’s swift response to the
federal air traffic controllers’ strike in 1981, which signaled to many firms
a new era of union busting and highlighted the increased risks of striking
for labor (Rachleff 1992; Rosenfeld 2006b). Recent economic changes, such
as the rise of globalization, have only weakened unions further (Brady
and Wallace 2000). While much of the postwar strike research treats the
labor movement as a more or less unified whole, analyses of strikes under
similarly unfavorable conditions historically find that the varied organi-
zational capacities of unions themselves are crucial, tempering broader
structural effects (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 1975; Cohn and Eaton
1989). Consistent with such claims, there is strong evidence that unions’
response to recent challenges has been uneven; some have pressed for a
renewed commitment to aggressive forms of social movement unionism,
yet this is by no means widespread (Mantsios 1998; Martin 2008). The
recent and momentous split of the AFL-CIO centered on this debate, with
the departing “Change to Win” faction citing the federation’s failure to
adapt to this new industrial landscape.
Despite an increasingly splintered labor movement and renewed schol-
arly interest in unions (Clawson 2003; Fantasia and Voss 2004; Milkman
2006), there has been virtually no effort to systematically assess the role
of these organizations in strikes today (however, see Beckwith 2000).
Drawing upon emerging work on threat and social movement mobili-
zation (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Almeida 2003), we hypothesize that
recent challenges, particularly firm resistance but also an increasingly
unfavorable political and economic climate, will reduce strike proneness
among unions that benefited from institutionalized collective bargaining,
notably manufacturing unions, while it will provoke militancy among
the growing number of “social movement unions,” especially those in
the service sector, that have been more successful responding to external
threats.
Results from a comprehensive data set of strikes from 1984 to 2002
demonstrate the utility of a disaggregated, union-centered analysis over
one that lumps all strikes together. Our findings provide new insight into
what remains a central, if fundamentally altered, weapon in labor’s ar-
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senal and the implications for the future of the movement as a whole.
More broadly, this research speaks to the role of threat in social movement
mobilization, particularly that from corporate actors, who occupy an in-
creasingly important place in today’s neoliberal political climate (Sklair
2002).
STRIKE RESEARCH AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT AT THE END OF
THE 20TH CENTURY
Most research on strike activity in the United States was conducted during
a relatively rare period of labor peace following World War II. Prior to
this, strikes were often contentious and sometimes violent disputes be-
tween unions (or unorganized workers) and firms, shaped by broader
economic and political dynamics, as well as the organizational capacity
of both parties (Yellen 1936; Snyder 1975; Griffin et al. 1986). Efforts to
reduce labor conflict (Brecher 1972; Goldfield 1989) eventually led to an
uneasy postwar labor-management accord that allowed unions to advance
the economic interests of their constituency while limiting their ability to
contest management rights on the shop floor (Davis 1986; Fantasia 1988;
Nissen 1990). This was especially true for workers in core manufacturing
industries such as auto and steel, who were able to win meaningful con-
cessions in wages and benefits through collective bargaining and striking
(Rubin 1986).2
As labor-management relations and, by extension, strikes themselves
became increasingly routinized, scholars began to explore why these
events continued to occur at all. Institutional economists in particular
were able to gain considerable empirical leverage by focusing on the
calculations made by unions and firms regarding the costs and benefits
of striking (Hicks 1932; Kaufman 1981; Cousineau and Lacroix 1986;
Card 1990). Labor disputes in the United States and other industrialized
nations were therefore conceptualized as “accidents” requiring fairly minor
revisions in the demands made by the two parties, rather than as the
contentious battles they had once been. This trend toward institutional-
ization was reinforced by the state’s regulation of all aspects of industrial
relations, from collective bargaining to organizing (McCammon 1993).
Such cooperation between unions and firms, incomplete though it may
have been, proved to be short lived. The past 30 years or so have witnessed
another fundamental shift in the American industrial landscape, with far-
reaching implications for how we analyze strikes (see, esp., Kochan et al.
2 It is important to note that labor relations were never completely institutionalized in
the United States, even in the manufacturing sector (see Rubin 1992).
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1986). Notable events, including President Reagan’s firing of more than
10,000 air traffic controllers and the breaking of strikes by Phelps-Dodge,
Hormel, Caterpillar, and other large unionized firms have served notice
that this tactic may no longer be an effective weapon in the arsenal of
unions (Rachleff 1992; Rosenblum 1995; Franklin 2001). There is mount-
ing evidence that firms have begun “baiting” unions into strikes in the
hopes of replacing their workforce with strikebreakers or at least extract-
ing meaningful concessions from the union (Bandzak 1992; Juravich and
Bronfenbrenner 1999).
Not coincidently, firms’ willingness to directly challenge the legitimacy
of unions comes at a time when the state has also become increasingly
indifferent or hostile to collective bargaining as an institution.3 Although
workers have the right to strike, management has the legal right to per-
manently replace striking workers (Norwood 2002; Lambert 2005). The
proliferation of neoliberal policies (Campbell and Pedersen 2001) and an
increasingly politicized and probusiness National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB; Gould 2001) have further emboldened corporate resistance (Fan-
tasia 1988; McCammon 2001b). The emergence of this new political par-
adigm reinforces Edward’s (1981) claim that strikes in America, far from
being institutionalized by the state, represent struggles between unions
and firms over control of the shop floor. It is evident that firms have taken
advantage of labor’s crumbling legal protection to erode gains made by
workers at the bargaining table.
To compound matters even further, a number of industries, particularly
those once regarded as union strongholds, such as steel and auto man-
ufacturing, have been devastated by overseas competition (Hoerr 1988;
Tilly 1995a; Baldwin 2003; Lee 2005). The mobility of capital has always
posed a challenge for unions (Cowie 1999), but the growth of free trade
has only served to hasten this process. Indeed, a number of scholars have
pointed to broader structural changes, such as foreign investment in U.S.
industries and the growth of the service sector, as accounting for much
of the waning fortunes of organized labor (Brady and Wallace 2000; Far-
ber and Western 2001).
Figure 1 provides stark evidence of unions’ weakened position in Amer-
ica; both strike activity and union membership currently stand at near-
3 While the labor movement in America has primarily won new gains at the point of
production, not the ballot box (Kimeldorf 1999), politics are important for most unions
(Marks 1989; Form 1995), and strikes have figured prominently in some labor policy
battles (Jenkins and Brents 1989; Cornfield 1991).
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Fig. 1.—Strike activity and unionization rate in the United States, 1930–2003. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
historic lows.4 The simple reality is that strikes today involve substantial
risk on the part of unions (Bandzak 1992) and are often defensive, a last
resort to stem off demands for concessions (Wallace 1989; Rosenfeld
2006b). But union approaches to such a costly endeavor are unlikely to
be monolithic. There exists a large body of evidence on historical strike
trends that suggests that, under similarly adverse conditions, the orga-
nizational capacity of unions themselves become central for understanding
how broader structural factors drive strike activity (Brecher 1972; Shorter
and Tilly 1974; Snyder 1975).5 We draw on these insights, as well as more
recent social movement scholarship on threat, to identify important cleav-
ages in the labor movement today. By systematically categorizing major
unions, we are able to generate a series of predictions regarding how these
actors will vary in their response to the challenges outlined above.
4 Unfortunately, the gap in the data during the early 1980s is a critical period in strike
activity. The Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped collecting work stoppage data in the
late 1970s (it now collects information only on those that idle more 1,000 workers,
which we estimate are only about 5% of all strikes). The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Services’s (FMCS’s) series began in the mid-1980s and will be described
in greater detail below.
5 Beth Rubin and colleagues (Rubin et al. 1983; Rubin 1992) find evidence that even
when collective bargaining is routinized union strength still matters in strike-related
outcomes.
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THREAT AND UNION RESPONSE
Building on the political process model (McAdam 1982), a number of
social movement scholars maintain that threat, typically measured by the
state’s repression of social movements specifically and citizens’ political
participation generally, is critical for understanding the timing and form
of protest (Olivier 1991; Khawaja 1993; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Van
Dyke and Soule 2002). Perhaps the most compelling empirical support
for this assertion comes from Almeida’s (2003) analysis of protest waves,
including strikes, in El Salvador. He finds that, during the period of
democratic reforms, mainstream groups engaging in conventional political
activism flourished. When the state became increasingly repressive, how-
ever, more radical groups emerged, drawing resources from their estab-
lished predecessors and employing more confrontational tactics.
While we recognize the fundamental differences between contemporary
U.S. industrial relations and authoritarian states such as the one described
by Almeida, this framework has considerable utility for understanding
strikes today. Specifically, the growth of firm resistance, as well as an
increasingly unfavorable economic and political environment, can be
fruitfully conceptualized as a clear threat to the legitimacy of organized
labor in America. Building upon Almeida and his distinction among move-
ment actors, we suspect that unions’ response will vary depending upon
on their ability to mount an effective counterchallenge. Such capacity for
resistance is determined by a range of union-related factors, including a
union’s industry, resources, and willingness to explore new repertoires of
action (Ganz 2000; Martin 2008).
There has been growing interest in the way unions have reacted to the
recent transformation of industrial relations. Particular attention has been
paid to new and aggressive approaches to organizing; some unions are
relying upon social movement tactics, broad coalitions, and appeals for
worker dignity to stem nearly 50 years of membership decline (Bronfen-
brenner 1997; Turner and Cornfield 2007; Martin 2008). Voss and Sher-
man’s (2000) research on renewed organizing efforts identifies the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) as perhaps the most aggressive
of the revitalized union movement. UNITE-HERE and the United Food
and Commercial Workers (UFCW) have also been relatively quick to
adopt these innovative methods of recruitment (see Crump 1991; Fiorito
et al. 1995; Fantasia and Voss 2004). Yet not all unions have embraced
this new organizing agenda; the Change to Win faction of unions that
left the AFL-CIO, including SEIU and UNITE-HERE, cited the AFL-
CIO’s failure to develop and follow through on a comprehensive orga-
nizing program as a major reason for the split.
While these developments are quite recent, many important distinctions
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among unions are rooted in their unique organizational histories. For
example, Milkman (2006) traces the divergent fate of labor unions in
present-day Los Angeles in part to their origins in the AFL and CIO,
arguing that AFL unions, particularly service sector unions, have a num-
ber of distinct advantages over their industrial brethren when organizing
low-wage immigrant workers. According to Milkman (2006), AFL unions
such as SEIU came of age prior to the NLRB and broader New Deal
regulatory framework, which gives them “an edge in the context of as-
cendant neoliberalism” (p. 23). By contrast, the industrial unions have
had “enormous difficulty transcending the New Deal framework on which
the CIO’s initial growth was so heavily predicated” (p. 24). Milkman’s
analysis suggests that distinguishing between old-order CIO manufac-
turing unions and more aggressive service sector ones can provide an
important window into the current prospects of organized labor.
In a similar vein, Cornfield (2007) sees contemporary labor relations as
marked by an important division between the industrial unions that
emerged as a strategic response to mass production, but who find them-
selves ill equipped to deal with the new challenges, and the mostly former
AFL unions that are targeting marginalized workers in service industries.
Evidence of the importance of a craft/industrial division can also be found
in analyses of the particular approaches unions take to politics (Marks
1989; Form 1995). Unfortunately, while this research has been sensitive
to the considerable diversity of unions within the labor movement, it has
largely ignored the implications for understanding strike behavior, instead
focusing on organizing and, to a lesser degree, political activity.6
Differentiating among unions to gain insight into the labor movement
as a whole is not new. Historical analyses indicate considerable variation
in the political, organizing, and strike activities of particular types of
unions (Morris 1958; Galenson 1960; Dubofsky 1969; Kimeldorf 1988;
Voss 1993; Isaac and Christiansen 2002). These past distinctions, coupled
with contemporary developments within organized labor, suggest that the
consequences of an increasingly hostile environment will play out differ-
ently depending upon the particular union in question. Indeed, Cornfield
(1991, p. 35) posited some time ago that considering strike variation among
different types of unions would help “broaden and refine” theorizing on
strike activity and labor activism. Yet, to date, no research has system-
atically examined this possibility.
Scholarship on formal organizations and social movements more broadly
6 There has been some limited analysis of the role of strikes in organizing (Martin
2008). For example, the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors campaigns in major U.S. cities
combined short strikes with other tactics, including civil disobedience, to organize
thousands of low-wage and immigrant workers (Waldinger et al. 1998; Kennet 2006).
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also supports a more disaggregated, actor-centered approach to the study
of collective action. Theories of organizations in particular have at their
core an interest in explaining diversity within organizational populations.
Stinchcombe (1965), in his analysis of organizational inertia, contends that
environmental demands at the time of the organization’s founding continue
to affect internal organizational dynamics long after those particular pres-
sures subside, which is consistent with Milkman’s (2006) claims regarding
unions today. Population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman 1987, 1989) ex-
amine how environmental changes increase the mortality rate of some types
of organizations while creating new opportunities for others. Even neoin-
stitutionalists, who seek to explain why organizations often come to resem-
ble one another, recognize that the strength of institutional norms often
vary dramatically within and across organizational fields (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; Lounsbury 2007).
Movement scholars have also explored how strategic choices made by
social movement organizations (SMOs) are determined by broader struc-
tural factors and internal considerations. Perhaps the most comprehensive
work on this topic is Minkoff’s (1999) analysis of the changing goals and
strategies of women and ethnic organizations in the second half of the
20th century, changes that were driven by a combination of specific or-
ganizational dynamics and environmental considerations. Despite the
modularity of protest repertoires (Tilly 1995b), the tactical considerations
of these actors are often quite limited; Van Dyke, Soule, and McCarthy
(2001) find that the use of contentious tactics by SMOs in New York
depended heavily on their particular membership base and goals.
Insights from these various substantive areas suggest that a mix of
industry constraints and somewhat unique organizational legacies and
orientations toward collective action shape how unions react to external
threats. Specifically, some unions are well positioned to respond to threats
by striking, while others may have no other choice but to acquiesce. In
what follows, we outline a categorization scheme of unions that takes
important organizational differences into account, and we offer a set of
theoretically driven expectations regarding how the effects of important
strike predictors, especially firm hostility but also the political climate and
economic changes, may vary across distinct types of unions. This approach
advances prior strike explanations and the literature on union revitali-
zation by accounting for considerable intramovement diversity, and it
represents an extension of recent social movement literature that seeks to
clarify the ways in which environmental conditions differentially affect
distinct types of movement actors (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).
We first consider those unions that still engage in strikes and are not
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legally precluded from such activity.7 We then identify a variety of di-
mensions that may condition union reactions to the threats outlined above.
These include industrial sector, organizing activity,8 and craft versus in-
dustrial faction. Given that these dimensions are highly correlated with
one another and to the historical legacy of particular organizations, we
identify four major categories of unions with distinct orientations to strik-
ing and collective action generally. These categories capture important
segments of the contemporary labor movement (the specific unions in-
cluded in each category are discussed in the data section). It is important
to recognize that this categorization scheme draws from prior conceptu-
alizations and insights into unions, many of which have not been system-
atically assessed within the context of today’s shifting industrial climate.
As such, the empirical results below provide an opportunity to update
and refine conventional wisdom regarding specific types of unions. We
begin by describing what we and other scholars (Milkman 2006; Cornfield
2007) see as the most important distinction in the labor movement today,
that between manufacturing and service sector unions.
The first category includes the original CIO unions. Despite the con-
tentious birth of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (Zeigler 1995),
the growth of these unions was predicated in large part on a favorable
regulatory framework (Dubofsky 1994; Milkman 2006). They represent
the essence of Fordist production arrangements, and, consequently, they
have been the hardest hit by the recent breakdown of such relations (Hoerr
1988; Cornfield 2007). As such, their strike activity should be particularly
sensitive to the antiunion political and economic environment. Although
institutional scholars have paid little attention to the process of deinsti-
tutionalization (see Oliver 1992), as Milkman (2006) has argued, these
unions’ investment in what are now outmoded collective bargaining strat-
egies should severely limit their ability to respond to the recent growth
of firm hostilities. Therefore, we expect countermobilization by corporate
actors to significantly reduce the rate of strike activity for the original
CIO unions. Indeed, a number of qualitative accounts of strikes by these
unions suggest that their labor militancy today is a last resort and when
undertaken is a defensive maneuver to protect gains won during earlier
7 Some unions, based on their constituency, are automatically prohibited from striking
(e.g., the National Letter Carriers Association). While this necessarily limits the di-
versity of the sample, we are interested in explaining variation among unions for which
striking is still a part of their collective action repertoire.
8 Martin’s (2008) account of organizing today analyzes the activity of local affiliates
of many unions included here, with the notable exception of AFL craft unions. As
there is generally little current research on these organizations, it is difficult to assess
how aggressively they are recruiting new members.
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periods of institutionalized labor relations (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner
1999; Franklin 2001).
Moreover, the state’s shift toward neoliberal policies has made the
original CIO unions particularly vulnerable both in terms of enforcement
of labor law and protection from the globalization of trade, which has
eroded their manufacturing base. As such, the decision to strike by the
original CIO unions should be negatively affected both by the decline of
the manufacturing sector and the growth of foreign direct investment.
Given their members’ lack of occupational clout, these unions have long
used their membership size to exercise political clout (Marks 1989). Thus,
we hypothesize that the presence of antiunion political actors should also
reduce the willingness of these original CIO unions to strike.
The second category includes the aggressive or revitalized organizations
that make up the core of the new social movement unions—those unions
that have received the bulk of attention from scholars interested in labor
revitalization (Clawson 2003; Milkman 2006). These actors have explored
innovative approaches to organizing that directly confront firm resistance
and other challenges to unionization (Voss and Sherman 2000; Lopez
2004). Many are part of the Change to Win faction and were among the
most vociferous in the unusually public debate on labor revitalization
prior to the AFL-CIO split. Given their reputation for militancy (Fantasia
and Voss 2004), we expect that threats, especially from firms, will increase
strike activity among these social movement unions. And while these
unions have focused on organizing, they have also been politically active
and have often relied on political allies during the course of strikes and
organizing drives (Waldinger et al. 1998; Manheim 2001). Thus, the social
movement unions may be less prone to strike when political allies are few
and far between. Finally, numerous studies document these unions’ com-
mitment to organizing low-wage service workers, the workforce of the
“new” global economy (Milkman 2000, 2006). It follows then that, for
these social movement unions, globalization measures may actually in-
crease their propensity to strike.
While the manufacturing/service split receives the lion’s share of schol-
arly attention (Milkman 2006), we identify two additional categories that
have important implications for union militancy in the current era. The
first of these is the original AFL craft unions. While such organizations
have a reputation of acting conservatively (Galenson 1960; Form 1995),
their skilled membership base allows them to wield considerable influence
on the shop floor. Therefore, they are distinct from both industrial and
revitalized unions, which represent mostly low-wage service workers. Of
course, these unions came of age before institutionalized collective bar-
gaining and thus, like the service sector unions described above, they are
less wedded to highly routinized labor-management relations. This po-
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sitional power (Wallace et al. 1989) leads us to expect that craft unions
will respond to firm hostility by striking.
Moreover, the political activism of the craft unions never reached the
same levels as that of the manufacturing unions (Marks 1989), so we
hypothesize that the rate of strike activity of the original craft unions will
largely be unaffected by antiunion political actors. We are less certain
about the effects of economic changes in America on these unions’ striking
behavior. While the fates of some craft workers are directly tied to the
fortunes of the manufacturing sector (e.g., electricians at auto manufac-
turing plants), others are employed in sectors, such as construction, that
are relatively protected from the influences of globalization. As such, we
hypothesize that manufacturing decline and foreign investment will have
little effect on strikes by the craft unions.
The fourth and final category is composed of just one union, the Team-
sters. Labor movement historiography highlights the unique and some-
times contradictory stances of the Teamsters relative to other labor or-
ganizations (Dobbs 1972; Friedman 1982; Russell 2001). Not only does
this union not fit neatly into any of the other three categories (not a CIO
union, not a craft union, and generally not regarded as the new face of
organized labor even though it has joined the Change to Win faction), it
is also by far the most strike prone, accounting for nearly 20% of all work
stoppages during the period analyzed. This comparatively high rate of
militancy is one reason why we consider the Teamsters separately. While
often viewed as relatively conservative (the Teamsters endorsed Reagan’s
presidential bid), this union’s record of aggressive behavior leads to the
hypothesis that, for the Teamsters, environmental threats, especially firm
resistance, will be positively related to strike propensity.
In sum, our theoretical framework for understanding the labor move-
ment today allows us to differentiate among four distinct types of unions:
those in the core manufacturing sector that have become increasingly
vulnerable and defensive in recent years, the growing number of unions
that identify as social movement actors, craft unions that have long relied
upon their own members for bargaining leverage, and the Teamsters. The
unique features of each category allow us to develop a series of expec-
tations regarding how their strike behavior should be affected by broader
environment within which they are embedded. Again, moving beyond
prior theories of strike activity, we recognize that the growing threat of
firm resistance, political hostility, and economic restructuring has fun-
damentally altered the playing field upon which unions confront corporate
power. While strike activity by some unions, especially those in the man-
ufacturing sector, should wane as these forces become increasingly pow-
erful, other unions have shown a willingness to confront these challenges
head on in the hopes of revitalizing the labor movement.
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DATA AND ANALYSIS
Our research considers how environmental threats drive strike activity
across four distinct types of unions from 1984 to 2002, a period marked
by substantial industrial and political reorganization. While characteris-
tics of the nation-state clearly influence labor disputes, the decentralized
nature of U.S. industrial relations benefits from a more localized analysis
( Jenkins et al. 2006); here we analyze strike activity at the state level.
Examining variation in contentious activity across states has been growing
among social movement scholars interested in topics from mobilization
(McCammon 2001a; Van Dyke and Soule 2002) to movement success
(McCammon et al. 2001). We first discuss the major theoretical expla-
nations of strikes, listed in table 1, and then describe our specific cate-
gorization of unions that will be used to assess variation in strike pre-
dictors. Because we employ a pooled time-series design (described in
greater detail below), we also note how time is incorporated into each
measure of interest.
Strike activity.—Prior to 1980, most research on strikes in the United
States employed the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) work stoppages
file. This database was discontinued in 1981 (the BLS continues to collect
data on “major” work stoppages idling 1,000 or more employees), and,
not surprisingly, this reduced scholarly interest in strikes. In 1984 the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services (FMCS) began collecting
data on strikes. This more comprehensive data set, despite its utility, has
rarely been analyzed (but see Martin 2005; Rosenfeld 2006b).9
9 While a vast improvement over the current BLS database, which captures an esti-
mated 5% of all work stoppages, there are some challenges when using the FMCS
database. First, the FMCS differentiates among strikes by bargaining unit, not union
or firm. Therefore, a strike at a firm by two unions is counted twice, and a strike by
a single union at a firm with multiple branches is counted for each branch. While
these types of events are not common, accounting for about 12% of all strikes, we
excluded them from our analysis (the results did not differ significantly when they
were included). Second, the database does not differentiate between strikes and lock-
outs, employer-initiated work stoppages that may be increasingly important today. In
their analysis of collective bargaining, Cramton and Tracy (1992) estimate that 10%
of such events led to strikes, whereas only 0.4% resulted in lockouts. If a similar ratio
holds for our data, then more than 95% of the events analyzed are strikes. Also, this
database does not include strikes associated with new organizing efforts. Although
organizing is regulated by the National Labor Relations Board certification election
process, there is evidence (Martin 2008) that some aggressive unions have integrated
strikes into their organizing strategy. However, this is quite rare; in Martin’s (2008)
study, only 24 such strikes were carried out by a sample of 70 large unions from 1990
to 2001. Finally, the FMCS does not differentiate between offensive strikes, those
intended to win new gains, and defensive strikes, those intended to protect existing
gains. Because we expect the latter to be particularly common among CIO unions,
our discussion of the coefficients of strikes by these actors incorporates the possibility
that the strikes may be either defensive or offensive in nature.
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Previous research on strikes has attended to various dimensions of work
stoppages, from the number of firms that experience such an event to the
length of time that workers are willing to strike. Here the dependent
variable is the strike frequency for each state in a given year.10 Earlier
research on strikes has tended to examine the strike rate (usually the
number of strikes in a given year standardized by the total size of the
employed population). Instead, we follow recent social movement and
labor scholars (e.g., Isaac and Christiansen 2002) and model strike counts.
Because we disaggregate strikes to the state level and to specific union
categories, they are relatively rare events (some states have no strikes in
a given year); thus, a more traditional strike rate measure would fluctuate
widely across states.
Firm threat.—A major premise of the current research is that firms’
growing resistance to unionization has substantially increased the risk of
striking and that individual unions will respond very differently to this
threat. Here we include two indicators of firm hostility, both from the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which regulates much of labor-
management relations in the private sector. The first is the number of
decertification elections, NLRB-sponsored elections that allow the firm’s
employees to vote to remove an existing union as their collective bar-
gaining representative.11
While decertification elections represent a rather dramatic way of re-
sisting unionization, firms also employ other tactics, such as firing prou-
nion employees (Dickens 1983; Kleiner 2001). As McCammon (2001b)
argues, these actions often spur unions to file an “unfair labor practice”
charge (ULP) against the firm. While ULPs are often common in the
buildup of a strike, the bivariate correlation between strike activity and
ULPs is only .35, indicating that this measure is capturing a broader set
of hostile firm behaviors (the correlation between decertification elections
and strikes is also modest at .32). Because we expect their impact to be
10 Research has also examined total strike volume, which is calculated by summing
the total person-days lost (size # length) for all strikes in a particular year (Shorter
and Tilly 1974). However, the underlying determinants of this outcome are driven by
different processes (Vroman 1989), and this variable is also prone to bias due to the
effect of large outliers.
11 Importantly, replacement workers can vote in decertification elections, which could
affect the causal ordering (strikes drive decertification elections). However, under sec-
tion 9 (c)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, striking employees are not permitted
to vote in the decertification election until one year after the strike has begun. Because
such workers are presumably strongly prounion, firms typically wait until after the
one-year anniversary to file a decertification election petition with the NLRB (LeRoy
1997). This does not apply to unfair labor practice strikes, a label used by the NLRB
to designate strikes instigated by some employer wrongdoing. In these events, the
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felt relatively immediately, neither measure is lagged and both are stan-
dardized per 1,000 enterprises.
Economic predictors.—Again, there is evidence that recent economic
trends, such as the globalization of trade, have also harmed unions, par-
ticularly those in the manufacturing sector. We include the percentage of
workforce employed in manufacturing to capture the decline of this tra-
ditional union stronghold. Related to this, a number of industries, though
especially manufacturing, have been hard hit by the globalization of trade.
While much has been made of the movement of industry offshore (Cowie
1999), Brady and Wallace (2000) offer compelling evidence that foreign
investment in American industries has significantly weakened organized
labor. Therefore, the models control for the percentage of workforce em-
ployed in foreign-owned firms.
Earlier economic analyses of strikes postulated that these events should
trend closely to the business cycle as workers’ bargaining position is
greatest when the labor market is tight (Rees 1952; Ashenfelter and John-
son 1969; McConnell 1981). To capture this explanation, we measure the
state’s unemployment rate. Labor economists have also traced strike ac-
tivity to inflation (Kaufman 1981), so our models include an indicator of
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, which we lag by one
year.12
Political predictors.—Like economic shifts, the political structure has
also become less favorable to unions in recent years (these measures are
also not lagged). We use two measures developed by political scientist
William Berry and colleagues (1998) to assess the receptivity of a state’s
political climate to labor unions (each of which is available from the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR]). The
first is government ideology. This annual measure uses interest group
rankings of the ideological positions of state representatives to generate
an aggregate government ideology score on a liberal-conservative contin-
uum. The scale assigns the highest scores to the most liberal states and
is useful for capturing ideological variation that is not perceptible when
looking solely at partisan composition of state government.
Second, we use a citizen ideology score, which also relies on interest
group rankings but which uses an incumbent’s ideology score as well as
their challenger’s in the preceding election after weighting them by within-
district vote margins to gauge citizen sentiment (see Soule and Olzak
[2004] for a useful application of these measures to social movement ac-
12 Unfortunately, the BLS only collects these indicators at the regional level, Northeast,
Southeast, Midwest, and West (selected cities in each region are used to compute




tivity). This is particularly important today as unions have come to rely
upon the public for support during labor disputes (Manheim 2001; Fine
2005). Moreover, there is growing evidence that social movement unions
have begun forming coalitions with community and ethnic allies (Wal-
dinger et al. 1998); thus it follows that a sympathetic voting public should
increase collective action, including strikes, by these organizations.
In addition, labor unions are often heavily involved in election cam-
paigns (Form 1995; Asher et al. 2001), which may divert resources from
strikes. Thus, the models include a dummy variable for presidential elec-
tion year. Finally, we include whether the state has a right-to-work law.
This statute outlaws the union shop, increasing unions’ difficulty in or-
ganizing and maintaining members. Historically right-to-work has proven
to be a formidable impediment to labor mobilization, and we expect it to
dampen strike activity (Ellwood and Fine 1987; Jacobs and Dixon 2006).
Union strength.—While primarily concerned with threat, we recognize
that organizational infrastructure plays an important role in collective
action (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Therefore, we control for the overall
strength/activity of the labor movement in the state. The first indicator
is the state’s unionization rate, or percentage of nonagricultural workers
who belong to a union. Because we expect a diminishing return on the
union density measure, a quadratic term is included in the models. Given
the growing importance of organizing and the historically close links be-
tween organizing and strikes, we measure the number of NLRB certifi-
cation elections per 1,000 enterprises, the primary means by which unions
organize new workers.13 Although this captures the vitality of the labor
movement in the state, organizing may also drain resources available for
strikes, so the direction of the effect is in question. Both of these indicators
are measured using two-year moving averages to examine more gradual
shifts in union strength. Finally, as unions are the primary initiator of
strikes, it follows that more of these organizations in a state should be
positively associated with strike activity, so our models control for number
of unions in the state.14
Controls.—In addition to the theoretically relevant variables described
above, we also account for other state characteristics that may affect strike
activity. As strikes depend on the availability of targets, the models include
13 Although there is a shift among labor unions today, especially aggressive ones, away
from the NLRB organizing model, Martin (2008) finds that the NLRB remains the
dominant form of organizing, even among the largest and most militant unions.
14 Unfortunately, the number of unions in the state, which was garnered from data
provided by the Department of Labor, is only available for 1999. Nevertheless, we
believe it is a reasonable approximation of the size of the union population in the state.
In the union-specific models, we adjust this measure to include the number of unions
in that particular category.
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a control for the number of enterprises. There is some evidence that the
movement of women into the labor force has reduced union membership
rates, and this may have a negative effect on militancy (Farber 1985).
Our analysis includes the percentage of employees that are female. Racial
composition has also been linked to strike activity (Dixon and Roscigno
2003), and recently some unions have been reaching out to minorities in
the hopes of expanding their membership base. Therefore, the models
include percentage African-American in the state.
Because our analysis examines nearly 20 years of labor strikes, we
include three time periods in the model. The first, 1984–92 (the reference
category in the models), captures the Reagan/Bush years, a period market
by considerabe hostility toward unions by the federal government. The
second period, 1993–95, saw the inauguration of Democrat Bill Clinton
and a greater optimism among unions for a political solution to labor
problems. By 1994, however, efforts to reshape labor laws in a more
prounion direction had stalled. Compromises suggested by the Dunlop
Commission were disregarded by the new Republican-controlled congress
the following year. Not surprisingly, many unions looked to a new, more
militant, direction. In 1995, in the organization’s first contested election,
former SEIU and social movement proponent John Sweeney was elected
to the presidency of the AFL-CIO. Thus, our third period, 1996–2002,
captures this new leadership direction. We expect that this will be asso-
ciated with greater labor militancy, especially by social movement
unions—a possibility we explore in the analyses that follow. Finally, we
also control for the nine census regions (West South Central is the reference
category).
Categorization of unions.—Our analysis of strikes rests on the claim
that there are distinct cleavages in the labor movement and that unions
will vary in their responses to threats in their environment. Table 2 in-
cludes the unions that we believe exemplify each category described above
and that continue to engage in significant levels of strike activity.
Original CIO unions include the United Autoworkers, the United Steel-
workers, and the United Mineworkers.15 The second category is the social
15 While John Lewis and his United Mineworkers were the driving force behind the
creation of the CIO, this was originally an AFL union and had an on-and-off re-
lationship with the
CIO after its founding. Yet it is clearly on the defensive (and in a declining industry)
in contemporary labor relations and shares more with our CIO category than it does
with any other union type. We nevertheless reran the industrial unions model ex-
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movement unions; it includes the SEIU, HERE, UFCW, and UNITE.16
Third is the original AFL craft unions, including the Carpenters and
Joiners Union and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
The fourth and final category includes only the Teamsters.
The categories thus include some of the most prominent and indeed
most militant unions in American today. As a whole, they encompass 34%
of the strikes conducted by organized labor during this period and rep-
resent nearly half of all union members.17 Importantly, this scheme dif-
ferentiates those unions in declining industries that are clearly on the
defensive in the new era of industrial relations (category 1) and the more
aggressive, mostly service sector unions (categories 2 and 4).18 The original
AFL craft unions (category 3) arguably fall somewhere in between. As
described extensively above, we expect that these differences will shape
the responses of the four groups to the threat posed by firm challenges
16 Unlike the other social movement unions, which are primarily located in service
sector industries, UNITE (which was created in 1995 by a merger of the Amalga-
mated Clothing and Textile Workers Union and the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, both of which are included in the social movement union model)
represents textile and apparel workers as well as those in services such as industrial
laundries. However, its use of aggressive social movement tactics and efforts to
organize immigrant workers strongly parallels other revitalized unions (Bonacich
2000). Moreover, UNITE merged with HERE in 2004, indicating a similar orien-
tation to unionism. Nevertheless, we reran the social movement union models ex-
cluding UNITE (and its predecessors); the results were similar to the inclusive model.
17 There are a number of reasons for limiting our analysis to a subset of all strikes.
First, our two objectives were to develop clear categories of unions that were in-
ternally similar and represented enough strikes for standard data analysis purposes.
By including only a few exemplar unions, we minimize the diversity within each
category. Second, nearly 400 different unions struck during this period. Developing
a categorization scheme to capture all strikes would lead to a larger number of less
meaningful categories of unions. One possible strategy would be to lump the remaining
unions into a single category. However, we believe the level of heterogeneity would
render any empirical findings meaningless. We prefer to limit our analysis to the unions
that continue to strike frequently and that represent the majority of union members
in America today. A comparison of strikes by unions in our four categories to those
not analyzed here reveals little difference in geographic disbursement. Temporally,
however, there is a slight divergence; while 28% of all labor disputes in the FMCS
database occurred after Sweeney’s election in 1995, 33% of the strikes analyzed here
are in the post-Sweeney era, another indication that we are generally focusing on larger
and more militant unions.
18 While the recent changes in the industrial composition of the economy has spurred
unions to search for workers outside their traditional industries (e.g., the UAW rep-
resents some graduate students), the industry composition for the union categories
remains quite homogeneous. For example, 88% of the strikes in the CIO industry
category were in mining or (nonfood) manufacturing. In fact, the only union to exhibit




to unionization, a rapidly changing economy, and an increasingly hostile
and disengaged state.
Analytical strategy.—We employ a pooled cross-sectional, time-series
design to analyze strike counts across states and over time. Because linear
regression with count-dependent variables can result in inefficient and
biased estimates, researchers typically use special count estimators such
as Poisson and negative binomial (Long and Freese 2003). Negative bi-
nomial is preferred in this case, and it is used for all of the analyses, as
there is evidence of overdispersion. We use Stata’s population-averaged
estimator for the negative binomial models, which captures both cross-
section and over-time covariation and which allows us to correct for both
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (StataCorp 2005).19 In the models
that follow, the betas represent a log change in the number of strikes
initiated by unions in a given state in a given year.
RESULTS
The current research seeks to gain new insight into the recent challenges
faced by the labor movement by analyzing strikes across distinct types
of unions. But we begin by briefly assessing the effects of important
predictors described above on all strikes across U.S. states from 1984 to
2002, which highlights the utility of our disaggregated approach. Table
3 presents a model for each of the four major sets of predictors (firm
resistance, economic restructuring, political process, and union strength)
along with controls before combining them into a full model.
Beginning first (model 1) with firms’ efforts to rid the workplace of
unions, it appears that these renewed attacks on organized labor have
not been meet with capitulation; both decertification elections and ULPs
significantly increase strike activity in the movement as a whole. Again,
as noted above, an increasing number of strikes, especially by manufac-
turing unions, are driven by management demands for concessions, which
may explain this relationship. The second model includes the four eco-
nomic indicators measured at the state level. Not surprisingly, strikes are
more common when the proportion of workers employed in organized
19 An alternative strategy is to employ a fixed effect (FE) model, which controls for
any time-invariant state attributes by (in effect), including dummy variables for each
state. The FE models necessarily eliminate any solely cross-sectional variables, and
they are less precise when using variables that are mostly cross sectional (Kennedy
2003). Because many of our theoretically informed variables vary mostly or entirely
across states, we prefer our populations-averaged approach here. Nevertheless, the
results from fixed effects models (not shown) are consistent with the findings presented
below, particularly for the important distinctions between CIO and social movement
union categories.
TABLE 3
Negative Binomial Models of Firm Threat, Economic, Political, and Union
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labor’s traditional base, manufacturing, is high. In contrast, foreign direct
investments, the unemployment rate, and inflation are not significant. The
political indicators introduced in model 3 suggest that unions will engage
in striking when they have political allies; the government ideology score
is positive and significant. In contrast, the presence of a right-to-work
law has a significant negative effect, which is consistent with the intent
of this law. It is also evident that political contests such as presidential
elections reduce strike activity. The fourth and final partial model specifies
the relationship between the strength of the labor movement in the state
as a whole and strikes. While union membership is positively related to
strikes, the negative quadratic indicates a diminishing effect as the union-
ization rate increases.20
We combine all of the predictors in a single model (5) to assess their
effects when other important variables are held constant. First, firm re-
sistance measures continue to have a positive effect on striking. Here we
see the expected negative effect of unemployment. While the right-to-
work dummy variable no longer has an effect, both the government ide-
ology and presidential election year dummy remain significant. These
initial models update and extend strike explanations by taking into con-
sideration current environmental conditions, especially the role of firm
resistance. As we reveal next, however, this practice of conflating strikes
by all unions into a single outcome ignores considerable intramovement
variation.
Variation across distinct types of labor organizations.—Previous ac-
counts of strikes have largely been content with models similar to those
presented in table 3, analyzing the collective strike propensity of the labor
movement as a whole. The claim we advance here, however, is that unions
will respond very differently to external threats brought about by recent
changes in the industrial environment. Specifically, those organizations
embedded in the now obsolete postwar Fordist production relations may
be ill equipped to address these new challenges, which should reduce their
rate of strike activity. In contrast, more aggressive unions, especially those
that have adopted a “social movement” model, have demonstrated a will-
ingness to respond aggressively when organizing, and we expect this will
extend to striking. Table 4 presents the effects of predictors on strikes
across the four union categories outlined above. Rather than examining
20 Graphing the effects of unionization reveals that strikes begin to decline at about
25%, which is a quite high rate of unionization considering the period analyzed (only
5% of the state-years lie above this threshold). One possible reason for this declining
effect is that unions do not necessarily have to strike to win new benefits for their
constituents in heavily unionized areas; rather they can use the threat of disrupting
production to leverage concessions from employers (Wallace et al. 1989).
TABLE 4
Negative Binomial Models of Firm Threat, Economic, Political, and Union
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each union category individually, we explore how important sets of pre-
dictors vary across the four types of unions.
We begin with firm resistance. As evidence suggests, these actors rep-
resent perhaps the most significant threat to union strength and the in-
stitution of collective bargaining (Fantasia 1988; Kleiner 2001). The mod-
els in table 4 allow us to assess whether unions acquiesce to such hostilities
or respond by striking. First, there is no evidence that CIO unions are
significantly less likely to strike when firm hostility in the state is high;
both indicators are actually positive, although they do not reach statistical
significance. This suggests that these unions may be less susceptible to
firm threat than we hypothesized, and there is some evidence that these
unions do turn to strikes as a last resort when firms press for concessions
(Wallace 1989). Again, these strikes may be primarily defensive in nature,
and more disaggregated data that take issue into account would allow
for a richer analysis of strikes by these unions.
As expected, efforts by firms to undermine unions significantly increase
strike activity among those designated social movement unions, which
provides further evidence of the growing gulf between manufacturing
unions and service sector organizations. Case studies indicate that these
unions have responded aggressively to firm resistance when organizing
(Waldinger et al. 1998; Fantasia and Voss 2004), and it appears that this
holds true for striking as well. There has been much made of the election
of a social movement unionism advocate, former SEIU head John Swee-
ney, to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995 and his call for more
aggressive unionism in response to employer hostilities. To test the effect,
we include an interaction between unfair labor practices and a post-1995
dummy.21 The coefficient, which is positive and significant only for these
unions, suggests that they have become more willing to directly respond
to antiunion firm actions in recent years. While our data prevent an in-
depth analysis of these events, we suspect that strikes sponsored by these
unions will include various forms of social protest designed to pressure
the firm on multiple fronts and mobilize external support (Manheim 2001).
Again, the first two models clearly illustrate the divergent paths that
manufacturing and service unions have taken in recent years, yet the
positive link between strikes and firm threat extends to craft unions and
the Teamsters as well. Craft unions have jealously guarded their influence
on the shop floor (Marks 1989), so it should be no surprise that they resist
management encroachment on their autonomy. The Teamsters also have
a long history of aggressive strike behavior (Dobbs 1972), and it appears
that firm resistance only increases this tendency, although less so in years
21 The interaction between decertification elections and the post-1995 dummy is not
significant for any unions.
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after 1995. While the effects of firm opposition to unionization are stron-
gest for social movement unions (especially the decertification election
coefficient), these findings suggest that both craft unions and the Team-
sters, two sets of organizations that have not figured prominently in recent
discussions of union revitalization, may also have an important role to
play in the labor movement today.
The next set of predictors assess the consequences of economic changes
that have buffeted unions over the past quarter century. Most prior dis-
cussion of industrial restructuring, including the shift of employment from
manufacturing to service sector industries and the rise of global trade,
has postulated that these trends are most harmful for industrial unions,
and the models provide support for this assumption. First, as hypothe-
sized, the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing is positively
associated with strikes by CIO unions. Considering that we include a
control for the total number of CIO unions (albeit time invariant), this
suggests that the declining industrial base of these unions indeed has a
negative effect on their strike propensity. By way of example, had per-
centage manufacturing remained at its average level in 1984 (holding all
other variables constant), the expected strike count for these unions would
be three times greater than current levels; for unions as a whole, the
difference would be much smaller, only about 60% higher.
Perhaps even more telling is the effect of direct foreign investment,
which also conforms to our basic expectation regarding globalization and
labor militancy among industrial unions. Every 1% increase in this in-
dicator reduces strike activity for CIO unions by approximately 6%. As
Brady and Wallace (2000) have argued, such investments create significant
challenges for unions; not only do these firms tend to be vociferously
antiunion, they also place competitive pressures on more established, do-
mestically owned firms where unions are strongest. These results, taken
together with the lack of effect for indicators of firm resistance discussed
above, suggest that CIO unions are indeed vulnerable to threat but that
it is economic restructuring and not firm resistance that is responsible for
much of their declining strike propensity. As our dependent variable cap-
tures both offensive and defensive strikes, it is apparent that globalization
has reduced even reactionary labor militancy intended to protect existing
gains.
Surprisingly, when we examine the effects of economic predictors across
the other union categories, we see one clear trend: percentage employed
in manufacturing has a consistently positive effect regardless of the type
of union in question, though the effect is largest for CIO unions. While
the Teamsters and the craft unions represent workers in a variety of
industries, this effect is somewhat unexpected for social movement
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unions.22 One possible explanation is that the labor movement has his-
torically been strongest in states with a large manufacturing base, and
this may have created a stronger union infrastructure (including cross-
union organizations) that continues to support striking.
The effects of the other economic indicators are more variable. While
Brady and Wallace (2000) have linked foreign direct investment to the
overall health of organized labor in the state, our analysis suggests that
these effects are disproportionately felt by industrial unions. Although not
significant, this coefficient is positive for social movement unions that
have begun to aggressively organize workers in the low-wage service
sector. The unemployment rate, which has long been an important pre-
dictor of strikes, is significant for craft unions and the Teamsters. Craft
unions in particular have historically focused on winning benefits at the
point of production and thus may be most sensitive to trends that weaken
their members’ position in the labor market. Finally, labor economists
have long linked inflation to strike activity (Kaufman 1981), but this
coefficient is not significant in any of the models.
Taking the economic predictors as a whole, then, the findings are con-
sistent with our expectations that CIO unions are particularly vulnerable
to the threat of foreign investment. Interestingly, however, the percentage
of workers employed in manufacturing is important for all unions, even
those whose constituents are employed outside of this industry. Moreover,
earlier economic predictors of strike activity such as the unemployment
rate and inflation appear to have waned in their explanatory power, sug-
gesting that strikes today are fundamentally different from those analyzed
during the period of institutionalized collective bargaining following
World War II (Rosenfeld 2006a).
One of the reasons why the United States has historically had much
higher levels of strike activity than other industrialized nations is labor’s
lack of political institutionalization (Hibbs 1976; Edwards 1981). Collec-
tive bargaining at the point of production, not the ballot box, has been
the primary mechanism by which unions win new gains for their members
(Kimeldorf 1999). Yet unions have long relied on political means to help
achieve their economic ends, and even craft unions have always main-
tained some political presence (Form 1995; Greene 1998). Our models,
however, suggest that the effects of the political structure vary consid-
erably across unions.
First, only social movement unions have higher rates of strike activity
with more liberal elected officials. These unions have been effective at
garnering political support (Waldinger et al. 1998), and it appears that a
22 When UNITE, which represents some textile workers, is removed from this model,
the effect of manufacturing remains statistically significant.
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favorable political climate is conducive to strikes by these unions. Unions
have also turned to bystander publics for support during conflicts (Man-
heim 2001), and we hypothesized that a more liberal citizenship should
spur greater militancy among unions, especially those willing to mobilize
widespread support through social movement actions. The results indicate
that it is actually manufacturing unions that are most sensitive to the
political leanings of the general public. One explanation is that these
unions in particular have long relied on the ballot box as a means of
influence, and when they are embedded in a more labor-friendly climate
this may embolden them. The fact that it is a liberal electorate and not
prounion elected officials that spurs strikes by manufacturing unions sug-
gests that these unions may be more willing to seek out external allies
than previously thought.23 The importance of politics for CIO unions is
buttressed by the fact that only industrial unions have a lower propensity
to strike during presidential election years, suggesting either a reallocation
of resources from collective bargaining to political concerns or the rec-
ognition that potentially unpopular strikes could damage prolabor can-
didates (De Boer 1977).
While other unions (including social movement unions) are no doubt
engaged in the political process, it is apparent that their propensity to
strike is not diminished significantly during important national elections.
Finally, the presence of a right-to-work law, long seen as an impediment
to labor mobilization, is consequential only for craft unions. These actors
are often organized on an apprenticeship basis and were (at least initially)
the intended targets of laws banning the closed shop (Dixon 2007).
Providing further evidence of the utility of a more disaggregated ap-
proach to strikes, even basic indicators of organized labor’s strength in
the state vary across unions. Both unionization rate and organizing ac-
tivity have the greatest effect on the strike activity of CIO unions, although
the latter is not significant. This suggests that, as the industrial base of
these unions continues to decline, they are increasingly dependent upon
support from the labor movement as a whole for winning new gains and
protecting existing ones. Percentage unionized also has a strong effect for
social movement unions and the Teamsters; this union has been immersed
in many labor conflicts by other unions given its representation of workers
in strategic industries like transportation. In contrast, craft unions’ strike
23 The correlation between the citizen ideology and government ideology measures is
.6. Although, as expected, this is a sizable positive correlation, it does indicate that
these two measures are capturing distinct environmental political dynamics. Thus, we
suggest that scholars be more sensitive to the array of potential allies available to
unions and how they may affect labor disputes.
Changing to Win?
121
activity is unaffected by the overall union density in the state, a finding
that is consistent with the independent nature of these unions.
Finally, there appears to be very little significant change in actual strike
behavior by these unions over time once other variables are controlled
for in the model. Craft unions have become increasingly less strike prone,
and, as discussed earlier, social movement unions are increasingly re-
sponding to firm resistance by striking after the election of John Sweeney
in 1995.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study begins with the recognition that strikes today share little re-
semblance to those that occurred during the period of relative labor peace
following World War II. The restructuring of American industrial rela-
tions, from the rise of firm resistance to the globalization of trade, has
clearly changed how unions engage in strikes. Drawing upon research on
threat and movement mobilization, as well as insights into social move-
ments and organizations more generally, we propose that specific types
of unions will react very differently to these new challenges. Some have
remained mired in the old methods of collective bargaining, even as these
institutions crumble, while others have advocated for a more aggressive
approach to unionization. The debate within organized labor over the
best way to pursue this strategy, which has split the AFL-CIO, underscores
the importance of a more disaggregated approach to analyzing strikes,
one that takes into consideration the diverse types of organizations that
make up this movement. And, while the manufacturing/service split is
perhaps the most important, there is evidence that strike predictors vary
across other types of labor organizations as well.
The findings clearly indicate that how we think about the factors that
drive strike activity cannot be separated from the nuances of the move-
ment itself. Labor unions are not interchangeable organizations; their
particular membership base, history, and tactical playlist all shape how
they react to broad shifts in the industrial climate. Here we see that the
threat of firm resistance actually increases strike activity by new social
movement unions in particular, but also by craft unions and the Teamsters,
while it has no effect on CIO unions. In contrast, the latter have proven
vulnerable to the growth of foreign investment in American industries.
Moreover, traditional predictors of striking, such as the unemployment
rate, are significant for only a small subset of unions, AFL craft orga-
nizations and the Teamsters, providing further evidence that we have
entered a new era of industrial relations.
Considering that strikes have long occupied a central place in most
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unions’ arsenal, these findings provide a number of important insights
into the future of organized labor in America. First, there has been a
growing sense of optimism among scholars that at least an important
segment of labor unions has begun to construct innovative tactics to
confront their declining membership base (Clawson 2003; Fantasia and
Voss 2004). Yet if unions’ ability to strike has dwindled in recent years,
then the prospects of workers’ economic progress are reduced. More tell-
ing, as Rosenfeld (2006b) finds, strikes on their own do little to advance
the interests of organized labor. Thus, it is no coincidence that the most
successful set of unions, those that have been able to recruit new members,
are more apt to respond to firm resistance by striking.
Case studies of recent organizing successes have shown that some
unions are exploring less institutionalized tactics, such as civil disobedi-
ence and the formation of coalitions with nonlabor allies, to overcome
obstacles to unionization. Strikes, too, must be reinvented and the tactical
playlist broadened to counter firm tactics, which range from seeking in-
junctions to hiring replacement workers (see Manheim 2001). Our findings
suggest that the same unions engaging in more aggressive organizing
strategies may also strike in response to firm resistance. Admittedly, our
data are limited in this regard; we hope that future research begins to
seriously consider the ways that unions construct successful strikes. If
unions are able to effectively counter employer hostility and a less fa-
vorable political and economic climate, then it is possible that we may
actually see a resurgence in strike activity, at least among certain segments
of the movement. Moreover, given the vulnerable position of some unions,
particularly industrial ones that often strike defensively, a more disag-
gregated analysis of strike issues would provide greater insight into labor
disputes today.
Importantly, the similarities between craft unions and Teamsters, on
the one hand, and social movement unions, on the other hand, especially
in their response to firm resistance, suggest that these seemingly very
different unions overlap in important ways. In light of these findings,
traditional stereotypes regarding such unions (conservative and invested
in old methods of unionism) may no longer be applicable in all cases.
Indeed, scholars interested in the changing face of organized labor should
give closer examination to these organizations, along with the standard-
bearers of union revitalization, such as SEIU and UNITE-HERE (see
Milkman and Wong 2000).
Of course, we recognize that there are forces beyond organized labor’s
control that pose significant obstacles to striking. Most notable in the
results was the negative effect of foreign direct investment on CIO union
strike activity. Moreover, industrial unions represent workers in sectors
that are not tied to a fixed locale (Cowie 1999), and the specter of relocation
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often looms over strikes by these unions. This is less of a concern for
either new social movement unions (janitors, hotel workers, health care
workers) or the Teamsters (truckers, warehouse workers). Our results pro-
vide compelling evidence that the epicenter of the labor movement today
reflects this shift toward a service-based economy and the advantages of
targeting immobile firms. Unless industrial unions can develop new strat-
egies (organize foreign-owned firms, forge coalitions with labor unions in
developing nations), they are unlikely to rebound.
Given the growth of contentious industrial relations, the findings also
have implications for understanding social movement challenges more
generally. First, while many SMOs target the state to win benefits for
their constituency (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), the growth of neo-
liberal policies, the globalization of trade, and deregulation all have in-
creased the power of corporate actors in the public sphere. Firms, in
contrast to the state, are not democratic institutions, and, as outsiders,
social movement groups do not automatically have a voice in the decision-
making process of these actors (Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008).
Given this challenge, we expect that, just as organized labor has learned
from social movement groups, SMOs may in turn borrow from unions’
tactical playlist and their considerable experience dealing with firms.
Additionally, our analysis also refines the threat model of collective
action. While still in its infancy, much of this research tends to privilege
political repression (however, see Van Dyke and Soule 2002). The findings
reveal that other developments, here economic restructuring, may also be
perceived as threatening by movement actors. Moreover, it is evident that
SMOs, even those within the same social movement “industry,” respond
very differently to the same set of challenges depending upon their unique
organizational circumstances. In our analysis, the most institutionalized
set of actors, CIO unions, tend to acquiesce, while those less mired in
traditional industrial landscape, unions like the SEIU, are quite aggressive
in their reaction to external threats from actors such as firms. Notably,
this contrasts with much of the theoretical foundation of social movement
research, which makes broad claims about the ways in which changes in
the state and the availability of resources affect contentious behavior
generally. As some researchers have shown (Minkoff 1999; Meyer and
Minkoff 2004), and as our study strongly suggests, such discussions would
do well to consider how important predictors are expected to interact with
distinct sets of movement actors.
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